We are searching data for your request:
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.
R. Jones, the son of a soldier in the British Army who served in the Boer War and the First World War, was born on 28th September, 1911.
Educated at St. Jude's School in Herne Hill he won a London County Scholarship and went to Alleyn's School in Dulwich. Later he studied physics at Oxford University where he worked with worked with Frederick Lindemann. He obtained his doctorate worked under H. H. Plaskett on the infra-red spectrum of the Sun.
As a result of publishing an article on infrared detectors he was invited to join the government project that was experimenting with radar at the Clarendon Laboratory.
Jones was responsible for co-ordinating scientific intelligence during the Second World War, and helped with the development of radar, breaking the secrets of German Beam navigation, preparing for D-Day and helping Britain deal with the VI Flying Bombs and the V2 Rockets.
After the war Jones was professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen (1946-1981). He published his autobiography, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (1978).
I can recall walking back to Wadham one evening in 1933 from the Clarendon, just after Hitler came to power. Lindemann pointed out to me that the world was heading towards dictatorships, with Stalin in Russia, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany; and Roosevelt had just won the Presidential Election in America. He wondered whether we should be able to survive without becoming a dictatorship ourselves.
Within a few weeks the Oxford Union Society passed its notorious resolution which had been either proposed or supported by C. E. M. Joad, that "Under no circumstances will this house fight for King and Country'. I was not a member of the Union, but I was disgusted. The news of the motion reverberated around the world.
I returned to London on the evening on Monday 26th September, and felt the tense calm of the London streets as people braced themselves for the seemingly inevitable war.
Then came Chamberlain's return with his pathetic scrap of paper and his "Peace in our time" speech. I was as angry as a cat which has just been robbed of its mouse. Those who felt like that were a minority among the almost hysterical majority who thought that Chamberlain had done a great thing.
On 15th March Hitler had invaded Czechoslovakia and on 7th April Mussolini had taken over Albania. The treachery of the Munich Agreement was as last obvious, even to Chamberlain; he now gave a guarantee to Poland, and so all would depend on whether the Germans would be satisfied with their present gains.
Around 20th May I well remember John Perkins coming into my office and going up to the map on my wall and saying, "This is the situation. The Germans are here and here and here and our Army is cut off and retreating to the sea at Dunkirk. The Chiefs of Staff think that we shall be lucky if we get twenty thousand out." The position seemed hopeless and yet by the end of the month we had recovered three hundred thousand.
The country was fired by the epic of the small boats that had sailed, some as many as seven times, into the teeth of the Luftwaffe to bring back our Army; and among those who took their boats to Dunkirk was my cousin Reg Mytton. I heard of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gort, standing on the beach with two Guardsmen as loaders while he tried to shoot down German dive bombers with a rifle.
Ports were being heavily bombed. Rationing was biting hard; and any remaining amenities of peace-time life was biting hard; and any remaining amenities of peacetime life were disappearing fast. A German invasion in the summer still seemed likely, and a counter-invasion of the Continent by us extremely improbable for long into the future.
I used to look at my wall map every morning and wonder how we could possibly survive. Anyone in his right senses would do the best deal he could with Hitler - but we had no thought of it. Even though we were tired by the Blitz, there was that "white glow overpowering, sublime that ran through our island from end to end'. It can be hardly be described to those who did not experience it; it must lie very deep down among human emotions, giving the individual a strange, subdued elation at facing dangers in which he may easily perish as an individual but also a subconscious knowledge that any society which has a high enough proportion of similar individuals is all the more likely to survive because of their sacrifice.
On 22nd August an object had crashed in a turnip field on the island of Bornholm in the Baltic, roughly half-way between Germany and Sweden. It was a small pilotless aircraft bearing the number V83, and it was promptly photographed by the Danish Naval Officer-in-Charge on Bornholm, Lieutenant Commander Hasager Christiansen. He also made a sketch, and noted that the warhead was a dummy made of concrete.
At first, we were not sure what he had found. From his sketch it was about 4 metres long, and it might have been a rather larger version of the HS 293 glider bomb that KG100 was now using against our warships in the Mediterranean. Indeed, it turned out that this particular bomb had been released from a Heinkel III, but it was in fact a research model (the 'V' probably stood for 'Versuchs' i.e. research) of the flying bomb about which we were going to hear so much in the next few months.
R. V. Jones - History
Book Review — A MOST ENIGMATIC WAR: R.V. JONES AND THE GENESIS OF BRITISH SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE 1939–45
This review was first published in Air Power Review Volume 21 Number 1, Spring 2018.
A Most Enigmatic War: R.V. Jones and the Genesis of British Scientific Intelligence 1939–45 is the first full length publication from James Goodchild, and is based on his PhD thesis. The book is predominantly structured on the wartime memoirs of Reginald Victor Jones (Most Secret War, published 1978), a Scientific Officer who formed the basis (indeed at times constituted the entire department) of the Assistant Directorate of Intelligence (ADI) (Science), a branch of Intelligence established within the Air Ministry during World War Two. Primarily as a result of his many post-war media appearances and publication of his memoirs, Jones attained fame as, among other scientific achievements, the man who “bent the beams” during the Blitz. Goodchild is clearly fascinated by his main protagonist but seeks to place Jones and ADI (Science) within the larger context of the war (and broader scientific and technical intelligence pursuits) as well as redressing a perceived historiographic imbalance due to over-reliance on Jones’ memoirs as the definitive version of the events it narrates. Goodchild’s book is best read in conjunction with Most Secret War, (a much lighter read) which is much referenced throughout.
A Most Enigmatic War is an academic text, and not always an easy read however, it does provide a fascinating insight into the defensive application of science in war — trying to understand the enemy’s technological and scientific capability, and how to counter this capability when applied to weapons of war. This may seem second nature to RAF personnel today, who are well-briefed on foreign powers’ radar, surface-to-air missile (SAM) and other capabilities. However, at the time this approach was completely novel and encountered many objections within Whitehall, not least because if British scientists had yet to make a certain technological advancement, it was often assumed to be “impossible”. This was particularly evident in the early assessment of the state of German rocketry.
Goodchild seeks to expand on the stories told by Jones by examining the accuracy of his recall and contextualisation of events as well as contributing many additional primary and secondary sources, background evidence and analysis to expand the scope of the history of scientific intelligence. In particular, Goodchild covers the “Battle of the Beams”, Luftwaffe night fighter defences (including ground-controlled interception (GCI) organisation) and the Vergeltungswaffen “Vengeance” weapons. In critiquing Jones’ version of events, the author highlights that many other agencies were deeply involved in much of the work that Jones takes unique credit for, and he gives interesting overviews of the functions of the Y-section (signals intercept), A1(k) (POW interrogation) and the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE), as well as confirming the well-known role of ULTRA decodes in this as in so many other areas of wartime intelligence. The author seems in two minds about his main protagonist, at times taking great pains to discredit Jones and his ‘egotistical’ and ‘magnificently boastful’ personality, whilst at other times acknowledging the important contribution that he made to the field.
The book undoubtedly achieves its aim of providing a long overdue robust historical analysis on a fascinating subject. However, by covering only issues which directly involved Jones the author draws rather narrow conclusions, focussing on his task of ‘rebalancing’ the history, and contending that Jones vastly overblew his own contribution to Allied success in World War Two. More broadly, Goodchild does contend that scientific intelligence remains an important field, having grown exponentially during the technologically driven Cold War, and now permeates RAF consciousness. The author also largely concurs with Jones in suggesting that scientific intelligence should be at the heart of the intelligence community and not relegated to individual Services. While Goodchild does not explicitly suggest how any lessons learnt during this period should be applied today, we can certainly take from the various narratives the importance of not only having a good understanding of the enemy’s technological understanding, but of being able to place this within a wider picture. In particular, understanding how it relates to the enemy’s organisation, how technology is applied and operated, and what countermeasures would therefore be effective. Nowhere is this better illustrated than the extent to which ADI (Science) became experts on German radar defences, their night fighter distribution and organisation and their GCI system for countering Allied bomber raids. It may be a pertinent reminder in this era of ever-increasing reliance on technological superiority that it is not just science or technology which can win a conflict, but understanding and application.
R. V. Jones - History
David Irving explains, Friday, March 19, 2004:
The Luftwaffe Raid on Coventry, November 14, 1940 : In 1974 the British Government had lifted the embargo on The Ultra Secret, and Frederick Winterbotham , the RAF Intelligence officer attached to Bletchley Park, was permitted to publish his book of that name. In about 1983 the Government began to release piecemeal documents and files from which the real background story could be pieced together. With the release to the public archives of the logbook of RAF Fighter Command it became plain that Mr Churchill had prior warning of about eighty percent of the Luftwaffe air raids on London, either from Ultra intelligence (theyhad solved the Luftwaffe's operational Enigma cipher), or from beams intelligence (locating over which city the X-Gerät blind-bombing beams were intersecting from late afternoon onwards, for calibration purposes), or from other sources. The odd episode involving the prime minister's behaviour on the night of the Luftwaffe Raid on Coventry could now be re-assessed (see my "Churchill's War", vol. i: "Struggle for Power", published in 1987). I conducted a rambling inquiry with surviving members of the British Intelligence community, and opened this dossier.
HOLD THIS MATERIAL ON DISC FOR LATER REFERENCE
Note on a Conversation with Prof R.V. Jones, FRS, at ca 3 pm in Selfridges, London W1 [March 28, 1984]
WE met by chance. I mentioned the Coventry draft to him. He insists that he is right and Fred Winterbotham's memory is wrong. He says that the first warning was given by the Air Staff at 4:15 p.m. to the commands, and even then it did not go out as the flimsies are still in the Air Staff file, unsent, filling in the gaps subsequently. He suggests that the "three o'clock" claim made by the later action report was window dressing out of hindsight, a cover-up.
Against this version, I told him of the John Martin diary entry, "No.10. False start for Ditchley. 'The moonlight sonata': The raid was on Coventry."
Winterbotham wrote ( TLS , [ Times Literary Supplement ], Jun 25, 1976) that it was not true that Churchill deliberately sacrified the city to avoid compromising Ultra. On November 14 ] he [Winterbotham] sent over in the usual blue van to No. 10 the "red box" containing the Ultra signal giving the target for that night as "Coventry" en clair , perhaps done at Bletchley as a result of lower grade information. In the evening, Winterbotham went to his cottage west of London and counted the bombers passing overhead.
Copy of a letter from Gp Capt F.W. Winterbotham to David Irving, January 13, 1984
YES, I think you have got it right about Coventry but there are a few points which might want a little adjustment.
It was Brendan Bracken [ right, behind Churchill ] who persuaded WSC to leave London against his will. I did not know WSC had appointments that afternoon. He generally rested until about 3 p.m.
One of the signals giving orders (beams etc) for the raid on London, around 12th Nov I think contained also instructions "to abort the London target and transfer to one of the Midlands targets on receipt of a special code word." The signal with the special codeword was received at Bletchley around 1:55 p.m. on 14th. This signal was not given to Jones for a very good reason which I will not put on paper. Hence [RV] Jones' persistent lie that no one knew about Coventry. It was the 1:55 signal which was phoned to me by Humphries soon after 2 pm. Bletchley had worked out the beam angles to cover Coventry, however Air Ministry wished to be absolutely certain before alerting Commands and the PM, and started a search for the X-Gerät beam. This was found over Coventry by 3 p.m.
I had an agreement with the Chief of Staff always to allow them time to study urgent and important Ultra signals before sending them over to No.10.
I think you will find the official timing given to the Inquiry on Coventry when Commands were informed was 3 p.m., not 4.
I understood (from [Churchill's secretary John ] Martin ) that they left London soon after 3 p.m. and were overtaken by the despatch rider in Kensington. It seems probable both my own signal which had been simplified (leaving out coordinates etc) and the official note from CAS, both confirming Coventry as the target, were in the envelope.
It was my job to select each day which important signals should go to the PM. My officer ( Humphries ) in my "Hut 3" at Bletchley where all signals were translated and strictly distributed sent me down a selection each morning (or by phone if urgent). I then selected what the PM needed to know and they went over to No.10 in a yellow box. Sometimes when he was at Ditchley or Chequers I would phone. Menzies [ Brigadier Sir Stuart Menzies , "C", head of the British Intelligence Service ] saw all signals before they went over. All these signals which bore my initials in red were then initialled by Churchill together with any action he wished taken, or comments, and returned to me at Broadway [ Intelligence headquarters ] where they were stored. They are a vital piece of history but every effort to locate them has been met with a blank. I have little doubt the Official Historians are sitting on them, and that PRO [ Public Records Office, now British National Archives ] will never see them. I made a rule that none of these signals which came from Bletchley to Broadway should leave that office (except to WSC). I think only Jones disobeyed this order. I had to write The Ultra Secret without records.
Personally, I always found WSC courteous and helpful. But then we were giving him his life blood on which he ran the war single handed until the advent of Eisenhower in 1942. I was interested to read that he had taken Dowding's side and asked CAS to give him a job. My old friend Jack Slessor let me read the account of the Leigh-Mallory affair. Quite disgraceful.
SANITIZED COPY OF ABOVE SENT TO JONES, Jan 14. D.J.C.I.
Copy of a letter from Gp Capt F.W. Winterbotham to David Irving, January 23, 1984
As regards the interception of WSC's car en route for Ditchley. This was from a letter from John Martin to a colleague of mine. But I have certainly seen it referred to in print. I think in The [Daily] Telegraph , and I am sure Jean Howard [ of Hut 3 ] could corroborate this. I enclose a letter from "Mike" Clayton who was one of the principal liaison officers (WAAF) between Bletchley and Chick.Sands intercept station. You will find it all in her book The Enemy is Listening. Alas she died last year.
She told me R.V. Jones did everything he could to prevent her writing about the "Mond Mond" signal changing the target from London to "Korn" (Coventry). Please return the letter.
In a minute on November 12, ] D.H.O. [ Air Ministry, Directorate of Home Operations ] ( D.F. Stevenson ) wrote to the D.C.A.S. [ Deputy Chief of Air Staff ] recommending possible counter action. He suggested that the damage to London or Birmingham was likely to be serious, and casualties high. "In consequence we should remember that the best way of turning COLD WATER on an operation of this kind from the point of John Citizen is to hit back at a similarly important area in Germany as hard as we can." Whistles were being fitted to the bombs for this attack.
Pertinent extracts from letter of R.V. Jones, March 27th, 1984 .
He sends me the MOONLIGHT SONATA decrypt which [Sir Frank] Hinsley [ Official Historian of British Intelligence ] had sent to him just as their vol. i appeared.
Points out that D.H.O. implied in his report of November 14 that he sent the executive order COLD WATER between 1300 and 1500 hrs, when in fact it went at 16:15 hrs. Thus 3 hrs 15 mins between indication that the raid was on and his first telegram. There could have been a comparable delay (and probably greater) in establishing the target. Asks why D.H.O. did not mention Coventry in his handwritten minute of November 14. "It would have been the most important item of information of the whole lot," particularly since the Pro Forma telegram could not (as I point out) be used.
The MOONLIGHT SONATA decrypt: CX/JO/444 of November 11, 1940:
etc. This gave in para 1: "W/T data for KG.100 for MOONLIGHT SONATA ." and talked about Target Areas 1, 2, 3, and 4. "KG100 will give the tuning-signal at 1300 hours on day of operation, to be repeated at 1315 hours by Luftflotte 3, callsign D3R."
Slightly less reliably deciphered was the final paragraph:
"In case the attack is not to take place on account of the weather report from KG100" Ob.d.L's main W/T station would transmit codegroup MOND MOND three times "five minutes after the signal MOND MOND the Knickebein beacons [ i.e., X-Gerät ] will be shifted on to alternative targets."
[Source file: CX/JO/444 of 11 Nov 40: Annex 1 to Appendix A of WHAT ?]
In letter to Aileen Clayton on Sep 1, 1980, Jones suggests her memory was at fault as to the date of the Mond Mond signal.
"This is just possible " he says, quoting a source not available to me. "There were no instructions for KG 100 on 13 November other than to prepare for operations from 1700 which were canceled at 1520 no target was mentioned in the signals involved. On the night of 12 November KGr100 did prepare for attacks on targets No. 34 (Liverpool) and No. 49 (Coventry) and these attacks were carried out. . . A normal KG 100 operation."
In her reply (Sep 4, 1980) Mrs Clayton admits doubts as to her memory of the date. "Budge's of Kingsdown recollection is that he was specifically asked when he visited the Air Ministry to listen for the MOND MOND signal as that would indicate the major raid was on."
Military and Veterans Research and Resources at The National Archives
Military records can be valuable resources in personal and genealogical research. We are the official repository for records of the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Coast Guard and other government agencies. These records include:
Note that most military records, including veteran's military service records, are not online. There are casualty reports, photos and other selected military records available in our collection of Online Documents for Veterans.
Research on Veterans in Military Records
There is no simple explanation for how to begin research on veterans. Your path will depend on whether your research is personal, genealogical or historical in nature and on aspects of the veteran's service such as: which branch of service, which conflict, what dates, whether Regular Army or a volunteer unit, whether they were an officer or enlisted personnel, and whether there was a pension application.
Research in Military Service Records
Military service records are the primary source of information on individual veterans. These include Official Military Personnel Files (OMPFs) for recent veterans, and compiled service records and pension files for older veterans.
Research in General Military Records
Other military records such as after-action reports, ship deck logs, and unit reports, rosters and histories may also be of interest, but it is generally very difficult to locate information on individual veterans in these records.
The Obscene Publications Bill was first put before the UK Parliament in 1955 as a private member's bill on the recommendation of the Herbert Committee  in response to what was seen as the failure of the existing common law offence of obscene libel. The Bill’s sponsor Roy Jenkins cited five prosecutions in 1954 [e] which highlighted the uncertainty of the law on obscenity  and that the basis of the existing law, R v Hicklin, had the effect of a stringent literary censorship. Consequently, the resultant Act made specific provision for a defence of public good, broadly defined as a work of artistic or scientific merit, intended to exclude literature from the scope of the law while still permitting the prosecution of pornography or such works which would under section 2 of the Act ”tend to deprave and corrupt persons likely to read it”. The Act also required the court to consider the work as a whole, put a time limit on prosecutions, provided booksellers with a defence of innocent dissemination, gave publishers a right of defence against a destruction order, provided the right of appeal, and limited the penalty of conviction. The Act came into force on 30 August 1959.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Sir Theobald Mathew, made submission to the Bill's Commons Select Committee on 27 May 1957 that his office would "take into account the existing reputation of the author, the publisher, the printer" before deciding on prosecution. Roy Jenkins wrote to The Spectator on 26 August 1960 [f] that the DPP's decision to indict Penguin was a misapplication of the law. [g]
Lawrence’s novel had been the subject of three drafts before the final unexpurgated typewritten transcript was submitted to the Florentine printers on 9 March 1928 with the intention of publishing a private limited edition of 1000 copies. Martin Secker refused to publish the work in this form,  forcing Lawrence to publish the first edition of the final version himself without copyright protection in July 1928. That August, US customs confiscated imported copies of this edition, as indeed did Scotland Yard. Although The First Lady Chatterley published by the Dial Press in 1944 was declared obscene by a US court (overruled several months later), it took until 21 July 1959 for a US court to rule that the first authorised unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover (published by Grove) was not obscene.  On 16 August 1960, Penguin published the first unexpurgated English edition of Lady Chatterley’s Lover.
On 18 March 1960 the Chief Constable of Peterborough wrote to the DPP seeking advice regarding the imminent publication of the book,  though there was no evidence of publication at this time. On 16 August Penguin presented 15 copies to D.I. Monahan legal proceedings were instituted, and a summons was issued on 25 August at Bow Street Magistrates' Court.
Counsels' opening addresses Edit
Prosecuting, Mervyn Griffith-Jones began by urging the jury to decide if the book was obscene under section 2 of the Act and if so whether its literary merit provided for a 'public good' under section 4, and that they must judge the book as a whole. Inviting them to consider as a test of whether it would deprave or corrupt he asked "Would you approve of your young sons, young daughters—because girls can read as well as boys—reading this book? Is it a book you would have lying around your own house? Is it a book that you would even wish your wife or your servants to read?"  This last question was the cause of some amusement in the court, and as a signal of how out of touch the establishment were with everyday life has echoed in popular culture since.  He also conceded that Lawrence was a writer of stature and that the book may have had some literary value but the obscenity of its language, its recommendation of what appears to be adulterous promiscuity and that the plot is mere padding for descriptions of sexual intercourse  outweighed any such defence.
Gerald Gardiner outlined the case for the defence: that the book was not obscene under section 2 as it would not deprave or corrupt anyone,  and that due to Lawrence’s status the work satisfied section 4. That "Lawrence’s message, as you have heard, was that the society of his day in England was sick, he thought, and the sickness from which it was suffering was the result of the machine age, the 'bitch-goddess Success', the importance that everybody attached to money, and the degree to which the mind had been stressed at the expense of the body and that what we ought to do was to re-establish personal relationships, the greatest of which was the relationship between a man and a woman in love, in which there was no shame and nothing wrong, nothing unclean, nothing which anybody was not entitled to discuss."  Therefore, the descriptions of sex were necessary and appropriate.
The defence then called 35 witnesses [h] to testify to the artistic, sociological and moral value of the book. The prosecution called two witnesses DI Monahan and Stephen Webb from the Board of Trade.
Bishop of Woolwich Edit
The defence called Dr John Robinson, the Bishop of Woolwich, to elicit "[w]hat, if any, are the ethical merits of this book?" After objection from the prosecution on the relevance of this testimony the judge agreed it satisfied the "other objects" criterion of subsection 2 section 4 of the Act. Robinson said that while Lawrence’s view was not Christian his intention "is to portray the sex relationship as something essentially sacred."  He continued ". as in a real sense a holy communion. For him flesh was completely sacramental of spirit. His descriptions of sexual relations cannot be taken out of the context of his whole, to me, quite astonishing sensitivity to the beauty and value of all organic relationships."  Pressed by Griffith-Jones on whether the book had any instructional value the Bishop admitted it did not but, asked by Gardiner if it were a book Christians ought to view, Robinson said "yes", over the objection of the prosecution that it was for the jury to decide if its publication was justified.  Nevertheless, the Bishop’s statement led to the newspaper headline "A BOOK ALL CHRISTIANS SHOULD READ". 
Richard Hoggart Edit
In testimony that was later seen to have had a deciding influence on the trial [i] the sociologist and lecturer in English Literature Richard Hoggart was called to testify to the literary value of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. In a detailed textual analysis of the book under defence examination, Hoggart was asked about the purpose of the obscene words in the book: "[t]he first effect, when I first read it was some shock, because they don’t go into polite literature normally. Then as one read further on one found the words lost that shock. They were being progressively purified as they were used. We have no word in English for this act which is not either a long abstraction or an evasive euphemism, and we are constantly running away from it, or dissolving into dots, at a passage like that. He wanted to say, 'This is what one does. In a simple, ordinary way, one fucks,' with no sniggering or dirt." 
Cross-examining for the prosecution, Griffith-Jones pursued Hoggart's previous description of the book as "highly virtuous if not puritanical". "I thought I had lived my life under a misapprehension as to the meaning of the word 'puritanical'. Will you please help me?" "Yes, many people do live their lives under a misapprehension of the meaning of the word 'puritanical'. This is the way in which language decays. In England today and for a long time the word 'puritanical' has been extended to mean somebody who is against anything which is pleasurable, particularly sex. The proper meaning of it, to a literary man or to a linguist, is somebody who belongs to the tradition of British Puritanism generally, and the distinguishing feature of that is an intense sense of responsibility for one’s conscience. In this sense the book is puritanical." 
Legal argument and ruling Edit
During examination of James Hemming the question was submitted by Gardiner whether reference to other books was permissible as evidence with respect to the author’s intention and particularly the production of other books to show by way of comparison what the climate of literature was and how well the authorial intention was carried out  further, that the 1959 Act had changed the law regarding judging the work as a whole and whether the Act required proof of criminal intent. Gardiner’s contention was that intent to deprave and corrupt was a rebuttable one and hence evidence can be called to prove there was no intent to deprave. In reply, Griffith-Jones cited R v Montalk 1932 that "the offence of uttering and publishing an obscene libel [. ] is established as soon as the Prosecution has proved the publication and obscenity of the matter charged, and a jury should not be directed that, beyond this, they must find an intent to corrupt public morals.'"  Gardiner countered that while he accepted the prosecution's argument in R v Montalk that intent to corrupt public morals is inferred from the act of publication, that presumption is itself a matter of fact and rebuttable. 
The judge gave his opinion that the defence was not justified in calling evidence to prove that there was no intent to deprave and corrupt, that defence could not produce other books with respect to evidence of the present book's obscenity rather than literary merit and that expert testimony could not be called as to the public good of the work which was a matter for the jury. 
Closing statements Edit
In a lengthy speech, which has been praised for its 'forensic advocacy',  Gardiner began by recapitulating the testimony of the defence witnesses, after which he went on to examine the tactics of the prosecution: "In answer to what these witnesses have said, hardly any question has been put to them by the prosecution about the book as a whole. The technique has been just as it used to be before the Act: to read out particular passages and say "Now do you call that moral?", or "Do you think that is a good bit of writing?" The one thing which this Act has made plain is that in future, in fairness to the author, the book must be judged as a whole."  In reference to the desirability of publication Gardiner invited the jury to consider that, "In my submission to you the defendants have shown, on the balance of probabilities, that it would be for the public good that this book should be generally available. I say on the balance of probabilities because . where the prosecution has to establish something in a criminal case the burden which rests on them is to satisfy a jury beyond a reasonable doubt where the defence have to discharge some burden of proof it is a lesser burden, it is the burden of satisfying a jury on a mere balance of probabilities."  And in referring to the judge's ruling on the admissibility of other books for comparison Gardiner simply entreated the jury: "All you can do is to judge it as a whole in the existing climate of literature and with your own knowledge of human life." 
In his closing remarks Griffith-Jones examined the definition of obscenity and the change of its wording in law: "It is true that the old definition is now altered, and the words 'those whose minds are open to such influences', are changed to 'those who may in all the circumstances read the book'. You may think that place rather a less burden upon the prosecution than hitherto, that it rather widens the scope of this Act than otherwise, for now, irrespective of whether the person reading the book is one of a rather dull or perhaps retarded or stupid intellect, one whose mind may be open to such influences, there is not any such restricted class. It is anyone who may read the book in all the circumstances."  With respect to the moral character of the book he observed: "It is said that this book condemns promiscuity. Does it? [. ] But it does [condone promiscuity], doesn't it? The earlier sexual experiences of both parties, then Michaelis, then Mellors – it is said that this is only showing how perfect sexual intercourse can lead to ultimate happiness. Members of the jury, the short answer to that view of the matter is this, which I think I put to one witness: what is there in the book to suggest that if the sexual intercourse between lady Chatterley and Mellors had not eventually turned out to be successful she would not have gone on and on and on elsewhere until she did find it?"  In a point not raised in cross-examination Griffith-Jones asked the jury to consider the passage of the novel on p. 258 [j] which suggested heterosexual anal sex, then a criminal act in England and Wales, which (though Griffith-Jones didn't belabour the point), had it been examined more closely, might have been damning to the defence case that the book was not obscene. 
After three hours of deliberation the jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty.  
Lord Teviot moved for the Second Macmillan ministry to ban all such publications on 14 December 1960 peers exchanged 18,770 words but voted down his motion on an aye/noe (spoken) vote. An aye vote would have needed Commons backing to make legal change. 
Richard Hoggart in his autobiography wrote of the trial: "It has been entered on the agreed if conventional list of literary judgements as the moment at which the confused mesh of British attitudes to class, to literature, to the intellectual life, and to censorship, publicly clashed as rarely before – to the confusion of more conservative attitudes. On the far side of that watershed and largely as a consequence, the favoured story continues, we had the Permissive Society. All of which is excessive and over-simple, but has some truth."  Philip Larkin referred to the trial in his 1974 poem Annus Mirabilis:
WikiTree is a community of genealogists growing an increasingly-accurate collaborative family tree that's 100% free for everyone forever. Please join us.
Please join us in collaborating on BURKE family trees. We need the help of good genealogists to grow a completely free shared family tree to connect us all.
R v Morrison: Child Luring Provisions are Tested by the Supreme Court of Canada
Online communication platforms give people the tools to engage in meaningful and productive ways. They have also given predators the opportunity to connect with children without supervision, and the ability to groom those children for the purpose of sexual abuse. Accordingly, Parliament has criminalized telecommunications with children for the purposes of facilitating sexualized discussions or the commission of certain offences targeting children. Section 172.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, or the child luring provision, criminalizes communication with children for the purposes of facilitating the commission of other criminal offences, including sexual interference.
Alongside this provision, Parliament added additional sections. These subprovisions create the presumption that an accused person is aware they are speaking with someone under the age of 16. These presumptions were rebuttable with evidence that an accused person took “reasonable steps” to determine that they were not speaking to a child online. In R v Morrison, 2019 SCC 15, the Supreme Court of Canada (“the Court”) considered the constitutionality of the offence of child luring, including the minimum penalties for the offence and the statutory presumptions created by Parliament.
The Criminal CodeProvisions
The full text of Criminal Code s 172.1 reads as follows:
172.1 (1) Every person commits an offence who, by a means of telecommunication, communicates with
(a) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence with respect to that person under subsection 153(1), section 155, 163.1, 170, 171 or 279.011 or subsection 279.02(2), 279.03(2), 286.1(2), 286.2(2) or 286.3(2)
(b) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 16 years, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 151 or 152, subsection 160(3) or 173(2) or section 271, 272, 273 or 280 with respect to that person or
(c) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 14 years, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 281 with respect to that person.
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.
(3) Evidence that the person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) was represented to the accused as being under the age of eighteen years, sixteen years or fourteen years, as the case may be, is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the accused believed that the person was under that age.
(4) It is not a defence to a charge under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) that the accused believed that the person referred to in that paragraph was at least eighteen years of age, sixteen years or fourteen years of age, as the case may be, unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person.
S. 172.1(3) creates a presumption that the accused knew they were speaking with a child if the person they were speaking to indicated in some way that they were a child. The presumption is rebuttable if the accused is able to provide evidence to the contrary. Section 172.1(4) stipulates that the accused cannot rely on the defence of reasonable belief in age (the defence that they believed the person they were speaking to was an adult) unless the accused took “reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person.”
Taken together, s 172.1 indicates the following: If the accused communicates with someone they believe to be a child for the purposes of facilitating one of the offences listed in s. 172.1, then the accused is guilty of an offence unless they can show that there was evidence that the accused did not believe they were talking to a child, or they were mistaken about the age of the other person despite taking reasonable steps to ascertain their age.
Mr. Morrison was charged with child luring under s. 172.1. He posted an online ad on Craigslist seeking sexual conversations and stated that he was interested in younger girls. When police contacted Mr. Morrison online, posing as a 14 year old girl named “Mia,” Mr. Morrison facilitated sexual discussions with Mia, asked for photographs, and eventually arranged to pick Mia up from school. Mr. Morrison was subsequently charged with child luring. In his defence, he argued that he believed that he was speaking to an adult online and was engaged in role play with someone playing the character of a 14 year old girl.
Mr. Morrison brought three Charter challenges before the court (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) [Charter] pertaining to Criminal Code s. 172.1. First, he argued that s. 172.1(3) violated his right to be presumed innocent under Charter s 11(d). Second, he argued that the presumptions in s. 172.1(4) were not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice and violated Charter s. 7. Third, he argued that the mandatory minimum penalties under s. 172.1(2)(b) violated the Charter s. 12 guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
At the Supreme Court, the Court examined each of the Charter arguments in turn. The majority decision, written by Justice Moldaver, addressed the first two issues but left aside the s. 12 considerations. A concurring decision, written by Justice Karakatsanis, addressed the s. 12 issues. Justice Abella, dissenting in part, found that s. 172.1(4) was also in violation of ss. 7 and 11(d) and was therefore unconstitutional.
The Presumption of Innocence and Presumptions in S. 172.1(3)
S. 11(d) of the Charter protects the right of an accused person to be presumed innocent. The presumption of innocence means that someone can only be convicted if the Crown proves its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The right to be presumed innocent will be violated by “any provision whose effect is to allow for a conviction despite the existence of reasonable doubt” (Morrison, para 51). In order for a statutory presumption that one has committed an offence to comply with s. 11(d) of the Charter, the link between the conduct giving rise to the presumption and the conduct that actually constitutes the offence must be “inexorable” (Morrison, para 53).
Under s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code, an accused person is presumed to believe that they are speaking to a child online if the person they are communicating with is presented as a child unless they are able to bring evidence that they did not believe they were communicating with a child. Even though the accused has an opportunity to rebut the presumption, Justice Moldaver still found that the presumption violated s. 11(d). In Justice Moldaver’s view, the relationship between someone presenting themselves as a child online and that person actually being a child is not “inexorable.” Because online communications are inherently unreliable, a trier of fact may be left with reasonable doubt as to whether the accused believed that they were communicating with a minor, but would still have to convict them of an offence unless the accused was able to rebut the presumption in s. 172.1(3). Justice Moldaver concluded that the presumption could not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter because it was not minimally impairing: it would still be possible for an accused to be convicted if the trier of fact was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed they were contacting a child, a conclusion they could come to by drawing inferences about the circumstances of the case (Morrison, para 71).
The Principles of Fundamental Justice
Some criminal offences require a “purely subjective” mens rea, meaning that the accused subjectively knew that they were committing an offence. Other offences, by contrast, require subjective or objective mental elements. For offences that carry a high penalty and significant social stigma, the principles of fundamental justice require that the crime contain a purely subjective mens rea element. Although child luring has a high level of social stigma and carries with it substantial penalties, Justice Moldaver was not satisfied that the crime rose to the level of requiring a purely subjective mens rea, though he did not come to a firm conclusion on this point (Morrison para 79).
Notably, s. 172.1(4) prevents the accused from availing themselves of the defence of mistaken belief in age unless the accused has taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the other person. Justice Moldaver held that this section did not create a separate path to conviction – it simply limited a defence, and therefore did not violate s. 7 of the Charter (Morrison, para 80). Instead, the Crown has to either prove that the accused believed they were speaking to a minor or that they were willfully blind as to whether the other person was underage.
In Mr. Morrison’s case, Justice Moldaver found that the trial judge convicted Mr. Morrison on the erroneous understanding that the accused could be convicted on the basis that he failed to take reasonable steps. Nevertheless, Justice Moldaver held that the Crown’s case was substantial despite the errors the trial judge made. Consequently, Justice Moldaver concluded that Mr. Morrison should be granted a new trial as opposed to an acquittal (Morrison, para 141).
The Mandatory Minimum Sentence
Under s. 172.1, if the Crown proceeds by way of indictment in a child luring case, there is a mandatory one year minimum sentence. Although Justice Moldaver did not address the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum, Justice Karakatsanis in concurrence held that the mandatory minimum violated s. 12 of the Charter because of the wide range of behaviours that constitute an offence under s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code. The majority decision remitted the issue of the mandatory minimum penalty back to the trial judge.
Justice Abella’s Decision on the Constitutionality of s. 172.1(4)
Although Justice Abella concurred in part with the result, she took a very different approach to s. 172.1(4) and disagreed with Justice Moldaver that there is only one path to conviction for child luring. In Justice Abella’s view, s. 172.1(4) provided a second path to conviction because it imported an objective element into the mens rea requirement separate from the subjective mens rea. For Justice Abella, as for Justice Karakatsanis, this objective element was concerning because of the wide range of behaviours that are criminalized by the child luring provisions.
Per the Code, child luring becomes an offence only when the accused is contacting a child for the purposes of facilitating one of the other offences listed in s. 172.1. However, online predators often begin communications with children through “ostensibly innocuous conversations,” which could include discussions about the child’s interests and personal life. Consequently, it is only the intent of the accused that grounds the offence of child luring (Morrison, para 200). For Justice Abella, it was the accused’s belief that he was communicating with a child that constituted the “sole difference between innocent online discourse and criminal child luring” (Morrison, para 203). Because the only mental element of this offence was subjective, Justice Abella held s. 172.1(3) was unconstitutional because it created an objective component to the mens rea requirement.
Under s. 172.1(4), an accused person could show that they took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person they were communicating with and demonstrate that they had a mistaken belief that they were not communicating with a child. In the majority decision, Justice Moldaver included some examples of how someone may have taken reasonable steps to ascertain someone else’s age online, including asking for a photo of the other person (Morrison para 112). However, Justice Abella held that the “reasonable steps” outlined by Justice Moldaver in the majority opinion are in many cases evidence of child luring in themselves. According to Justice Abella, there are few reliable ways to ascertain an individual’s age online, especially when communicating with children who may not have access to government-issued identification. Consequently, many of the potential steps the majority said an accused person could have taken are, in and of themselves, potential evidence of child luring. Asking for photographs or asking about one’s family or schooling is exactly what someone luring a child might do in order to groom and facilitate a relationship that could lead to offences committed against the child.
Both Justice Moldaver and Justice Abella’s decisions highlight the inherent difficulty of prosecuting offences where the only difference between potentially innocuous conduct and criminal conduct is subjective intent (or objective reasonableness of belief) of the accused. S. 172.1 is an incredibly broad provision, which is in keeping with the reality that child predators may take a multitude of different approaches to grooming and luring children for the commission of offences against them. However, the broadness of the offence provision also creates a risk that innocuous online contact, whether it be with adults who are role playing or by those attempting to take reasonable steps to ascertain the age of a child online, may be criminalized.
Parliament or the courts may wish to create additional restrictions to the scope on the offence, for example by providing that that the discussions should have a sexual element of them. Then again, this raises the issue that online predators will spend less time grooming children online and attempt to move the discussion offline more quickly, leaving children more vulnerable to predatory behaviour in real life. It is clear that Parliament created the offence of child luring to ensure that predators are caught before any other offences are physically committed against children. Clearly, there are good public policy reasons why one would want to make it easier to catch potential predators by casting the net broadly. Nevertheless, this also raises concerns about the type of innocent conduct that could be caught and the difficulty in establishing subjective intent given the context of online conversations, which can be hard for a court to understand. If Parliament or the courts decided to require that online discussions become sexual in nature before an offence is deemed to have been committed, this could expose children to harm even before physical contact is made by way of exposing them to explicit conversations online with adults. Consequently, there is a tension between having the offence defined broadly enough to protect children from any potentially harmful contact with adults online and having it so broad that innocent conduct is criminalized.
In proving the offence of child luring, the context almost entirely defines whether behaviour is innocent or not. This reliance on context creates evidentiary hurdles that are difficult to overcome for both the Crown and the accused, which in turn makes the offence itself difficult to define and prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is such a wide variety of conduct criminalized by s. 172.1, there is a risk that innocent people may be convicted, which is unacceptable. On the other hand, defining the offence too narrowly risks leaving children exposed to harm by adults they meet online, which is also an unacceptable risk for the criminal justice system to assume. Either way, it is clear that either Parliament or the courts should provide additional clarification to figure out just where the line should be drawn between protecting the innocent from criminalization and protecting children from online predators.
Dow Jones 30 Industrial Index , DJIA
The Dow Jones Industrial Average is the most well-known share index in the USA. The Dow Jones was developed by Charles Henry Dow and originally contained just 12 American companies. It was published for the first time in May 1896 and opened at a level of 40.94 points. Today, the Dow Jones Industrial Average consists of the 30 most important market-leading companies on the American stock exchange and reflects their growth. (read more)
Like the Swiss Market Index (SMI), the Dow Jones is a price index. The shares included in it are weighted according to price the index level represents the average of the shares included in it. Dividend payments are not considered in the index.
The inclusion of a company in the Dow Jones Industrial Average does not depend on defined criteria. Instead, an independent Wall Street Journal commission decides whether a share is to be included or excluded. There are no fixed times for reviewing the composition of the index, since changes are only made by the commission as and when they are needed.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average is traded on Wall Street each trading day between 3:30 pm and 10:00 pm CET.
R. V. Jones - History
Watchmakers and Clockmakers of the World (Vol I) by G. H. Baillie first published by Methuen, London, 1929 later editions by N.A.G. Press, London
A listing of clockmakers who flourished until 1825. Entries give geographic location, dates and type of work. There is also a listing of names with alternative spellings and a list of place names and maps
Watchmakers and Clockmakers of the World (Vol II) by Brian Loomis Robert Hale Ltd., London
Written as a supplement to the late G.H. Baillie's _Watchmakers and Clockmakers of the World (Vol. I) Contains approximately 35,000 entries, including information for clockmakers who flourished from 1820 to 1875. It also includes additional information about many of those listed in the original work.
Old Clocks and Watches and their Makers by F. J. Britten assorted publishers and reprints from 1881 - 2000
First published in 1881, there were 14 subsequent editions through 1955, with reprints as recent as 2000. Has between 25,000 - 50,000 names listed, depending on edition.
Dictionary of American Clock and Watch Makers by Kenneth A. Sposato Kenneth A. Sposato, White Plains, NY
Watch makers, clock peddlers, case makers, jewelers, label printers, dial makers, and inventors are listed. Entries provide working dates and a geographic location. Many entries provide birth and death dates and special achievements, and some entries are keyed to the bibliography for additional references.
American Clockmakers & Watchmakers by S & T Spittler and C. Bailey Arlington Book Company, Inc.
Covers 16,000 makers with paragraphs of information on thousands of better known makers.
Dictionnaire des Horlogers Francais by Tardy Tardy, Paris
(In French) Alphabetical listing of over 23,000 names, including many photographs, drawings, marks, signatures, and portraits. There are several specialized indexes including one by city.
Chronometer Makers of the World by T. Mercer N.A.G. Press
General history, identification marks and extensive listing names/dates/anecdotal detail of makers and associated craftsmen.
Clock and Watch Trademark Index, European Origin by Karl Kochmann Clockworks Press
Massive listing of European trademarks, wordmarks and company names. Includes an illustration of each mark, the name and address of the manufacturer, and the dates when registered. 989 pages.
Clockmakers & Watchmakers of Central England by Joseph McKenna Mayfield Books, Mayfield, Ashbourne, England
A detailed study of clockmaking and watchmaking in Birmingham and Coventry and the three surrounding counties of Warwickshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire. Includes watchmakers' & clockmakers' trademarks and their makers' listed by town.
British Clockmakers & Watchmakers Apprentice Records 1710-1810 by Dennis Moore Mayfield Books, Mayfield, Ashbourne, England
The apprenticeship details of over 14,000 clockmakers, watchmakers and others involved in the horological trade in Britain, listed under both the apprentice and his master, extracted from the tax records in the Public Record Office. Included are not only those who trained in London and are recorded by the Clockmakers' Company, but most importantly, also those who were members of other companies and those who worked in the provinces, whose details have never before been published.
Clockmakers and Watchmakers of Maryland, 1660-1900 by Whisker, James Biser, PhD The Edwin Mellen Press Ltd., New York
Using mainly original sources (US census, tax lists, advertisements, family records) this volume details the clock- and watchmakers in Maryland between 1660-1900.
Pennsylvania Clockmakers and Watchmakers, 1660-1900 by Whisker, James Biser, PhD The Edwin Mellen Press Ltd., New York
Using mainly original sources (US Census, tax lists, advertisements, family records, etc.) this volume details the clock- and watchmakers in the Province of and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania between 1660 and 1900.
Your clock has a name, trademark or signature on it. Great! It should be easy to look up the name and find out exactly when the clock was made, right? It's not always that easy. Although a name can be a good starting point for dating a clock, pinpointing the year it was made can still be difficult for a number of reasons.
For one thing, the name on the clock may not always refer to its maker. It was common practice during much of the 19th century for the retailer who sold the clock to put its name on the dial. In many areas of retailing this "private labeling" is still a common practice, like when a large supermarket chain like Safeway labels some of their food products as the "Safeway" brand, even though it was made by a different name-brand food manufacturer.
For example, a clock with the name "J. Kent, London" may either be the name of the clockmaker or the name of the proprietor who sold it. You may be able to find historical records of the retailer that can help date the clock within a certain range
There are other potential pitfalls in relying solely on a name to date a clock, even when you can determine positively that the name is that of its maker.The movement could have been removed from its original case (perhaps because of damage to the case) and
"married" to an empty clock case in need of a movement. For example, a movement made in1890 by Seth Thomas might wind up in a Waterbury clock case made years before.
With these caveats in mind, it can still be quite helpful to consult on of the resources (listed below) that give the names and working dates of the multitudes of clockmakers working throughout the world in the past few centuries. Keep in mind that no one list is complete. Even if the name on your clock (if it has one) is not a listed one, your clock could still be quite old. In determining its age, it's important to include many factors other than just the name. Always consider the clock's case style and materials, type of movement, decorative elements, model (if known), patina, and any known restoration work or documentation in addition to a name.
If you don't find your maker's name listed in our searchable online database of more than 10,000 clockmakers , try consulting a copy of one of the major references listed below. Some are currently out of print and may be available only through your local city, county or university library. They may also be purchased through online booksellers or dealers in out of print books .